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Abstract
Traditional regulatory approaches for environmental protection do not consider
the costs and benefits of the standards they impose. Further, imposing strict performance
standards on firms with heterogeneous control costs leads to an inefficient allocation of
resources devoted to pollution control. This paper explores the use of emission
allowance trading as a way to improve economic efficiency within the context of
environmental protection. PM10 air pollution from sources within the Las Vegas Valley
is used as the case study.
This paper found that an emission trading program in this particular case study
would not live up to the theoretical expectations. Although, emissions trading did show
some potential for reducing the amount of money spent to reduce PM10 air pollution,
technical problems such as increased monitoring costs, and complicated trading rules
would detract the any cost savings that would accrue through allowance trades. In
addition, political and legal factors would pose a significant obstacle to implementing the
considered trading program.
Although, this particular case study did not prove to be especially conducive to a
decentralized regulatory structure, allowance trading proved to be an attractive policy
instrument, offering many advantages over traditional regulatory approaches.
Foreword: Pollution in a growing economy
The environment and the economy are inter-linked. The environment supplies material
and energy inputs to the economy. The economy transforms these inputs into forms useful to
society, and produces waste as a byproduct. The environment, however, has a limited ability to
assimilate this waste. The end result of this interaction is increased ambient levels of pollution.
Given this relationship, it is no surprise that as economic development progresses in Las Vegas,
environmental quality is decreasing.
The problem facing Las Vegas is one of resource allocation. Resources in our society are
limited. Government agencies and the business community both face budget constraints. The
resources devoted to pollution control take away from resources that could be devoted to other
things like the creation of more jobs through continued business investments. Pollution control
also adds an additional expense to the production process, making products more expensive for
consumers. Both of these impacts can adversely affect the economy. In point, almost everyone
wants pollution free air and water, but few are willing to achieve this if it means higher prices
and the loss of jobs. (Table 1)
This paper does not hope to solve the complicated resource allocation problem facing Las
Vegas as it continues to grow. What it will address, is an alternative policy instrument that can
be used to help improve this resource allocation problem by achieving a specific level of
environmental quality at a lower cost.
EmiiromentaJ Quality
EQmaH Figure 1 Environmental Quality vs.Economic Development
The follouing production possibilities
frontier represents the mnaKimum
attainable output combinations of EQ and
EG. Note that there is a trade off
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1) Introduction
Protecting air quality in a growing urban area such as Las Vegas is a dim reality. Simply
stated, cleaner air costs money and lots of it. While the environmental conscience in each of us
cries out for cleaner air, few are willing to achieve this if it means sacrificing employment, or
higher prices. This is especially true for local politicians whose very livelihood depends on
"pro-business" policies. Firms who face high pollution control costs must raise prices, or lay off
workers to compensate for these costs. In many cases firms are forced out of business due to
environmental regulations. Needless to say, cost-effective regulatory policies are becoming
increasingly prominent. This trend can be attributed to the growing awareness of budgetary
trade-offs, concerns over marketplace competitiveness, and the economics of demand which
suggest: "make pollution control cheap and easy, and more might buy it". The latter will be the
focus of this paper. The harsh reality of pollution control is not hopeless. Pollution control
policies can be reformed or modified so environmental goals, such as improved air quality, can
be achieved at a lower overall cost. Emission allowance trading is an example of such a policy.
Emission allowance trading is a regulatory policy that is gaining importance as
alternative to traditional command and control policies for protecting air quality. Emission
trading is an incentive based approach that rations the quantity of allowable emissions. The
reduction goal determines the amount of emission allowances available for trade, and market
forces set a price for each emission credit. The fact that each increment of pollution is given a
price creates a strong incentive for businesses to reduce their emissions. Firms enter a new
business namely pollution control.
Emission trading is not a new concept. Economists have long extolled the benefits of
market based approaches on the grounds of efficiency. They reduce the amount of resources
devoted to pollution control. Recent trends in regulatory policy suggest a strong preference for
incentive based approaches due to their cost saving advantages. Ground breaking programs such
as the Acid Rain Program and California's RECLAIM program have shown that emissions
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trading can lower the cost of meeting a desired level of ambient air quality. This historical
experience, along with the theoretically modeled efficiency gains make emissions trading an
attractive alternative relative to the command and control methods traditionally used. In an era
where cost-effectiveness is given a high priority, these benefits should be especially appealing to
policy makers.
1.1)The Problem: PM10 in the Las Vegas Valley
The Las Vegas Valley is classified by EPA as a serious non-attainment area for
paniculate matter with a diameter of 10 microns or less (PMIO). PMIO consists of minute
particles that obscure visibility and cause severe respiratory problems when inhaled into the
lungs. The primary contributors to man caused PMIO in the Valley are construction activities,
accounting for approximately 40% of the PMIO inventory annually. Aggregate processing, and
disturbed land are also substantial contributors. Based on current growth trends, industrial
sources, and construction activities will continue be a major constraint to attainment of the
National Ambient Air Quality Standard for PMIO.
1.2) Response
Under pressure from the community and from EPA, the Clark County Health District
Air Pollution Control (APC) Division has tightened the regulations governing PM10. The
County has responded to this problem in many ways. First, APC has adopted strict and
complicated performance standards for PMIO sources. They have also mandated the use of "Best
Available Control Technology" (BACT) for all stationary sources in the non-attainment area.
This BACT requirement prescribes what kind of control equipment each stationary source must
use. Also, APC has added enforcement personnel, and increasing fines for violations. APC
continues to extend their regulatory hand to include smaller and smaller sources categories
where resulting air quality gains are minimal. Soon the County will run out of things to
regulate. These efforts, though well intended, only add to the total allocation of resources
devoted to pollution control, because facilities are all subject to the same rigorous standards
irrespective of their relative contribution to PMIO emissions in the Valley. In total, the County
now pays more for enforcement and industry pays more for compliance with little measurable
gain in ah" quality. By all counts, this defies the very definition of cost-effectiveness. Clearly,
the need exists to explore alternative policies to address this problem.
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1.3) Purpose
The purpose of this paper will be to assess the feasibility of implementing an emissions
trading (ET) program focused on PM10 emitting sources in the Las Vegas Valley. The criteria
used to determine feasibility will include cost-effectiveness, technical problems, and program
acceptability. The question "Is emission trading a better alternative to command and control
regulations for this particular air quality problem ?" provides the primary motivation for the
paper.
1.4) Descriptions of Sections to Follow
The first section of this paper will provide background information on emissions trading
(ET) and command and control regulatory approaches. Included hi this section will be a
definition of ET along with its key characteristics, economic critique of CAC, and reasons for
resistance to ET. The second section will include a literature review, highlight past experience
with ET under the "Acid Rain Program" and "RECLAIM", and a market simulation that
compares costs under both ET and CAC regulatory approaches. The third section will cover
issues related to implementing a trading program hi Las Vegas and analysis of feasibility. The
paper will conclude by re-stating the major findings of the paper.
2) Background
2.1) A Definition of Market Incentives
Market-based instruments are regulations that encourage behavior through price signals.
These policy instruments, such as tradable permits or pollution charges, are often described as
"harnessing market forces" because if they are properly implemented, they encourage firms,
through economic incentives, to undertake pollution control efforts that both are in their
financial self-interest and that will collectively meet policy goals.
Emission trading is a quantity rationing instrument. Emission permits or allowances as
they are often called, specify a predetermined total level of emissions. Firms that keep
emissions below their allotted level may sell their surplus permits or use them to offset higher
emissions at other locations. Once permits have been issued, market forces decide how control
responsibility will be allocated among polluters. Instead of equalizing control responsibility
across emission sources, emission trading equalizes control costs. The primary advantages of
emissions trading over traditional regulatory methods, are cost-effectiveness (they lower the
price of achieving a given level of environmental quality), and dynamic efficiency which are
secondary effects that lower costs in input markets through increased competition. Dynamic
efficiency is a direct result of the efforts firms make to invest in innovative emission control
strategies.
2.2) Rationale for Economic Incentives
The rationale for tradable permits is straightforward. The market mis-allocates resources
in the face of negative externalities because individual firms do not bear the full consequences
of their polluting activities (Nichols 1984). As a result, firms have little incentive to control
their pollution. The use of tradable permits corrects this problem by creating a market for
pollution and a corresponding market price for the right pollute. The idea is simple enough.
Trading programs make pollution a valuable commodity; firms realize it is in their financial best
interest to reduce emissions.
Market based trading structures allocate control efforts in terms of marginal control
costs. Control efforts are focused where they will yield the greatest benefits. This allows firms
the flexibility to decide their own privately optimal level of control. It also allows environmental
goals to be attained at a lower overall cost. This is cited as one of the primary virtues of
incentive based alternatives.
Under a emission trading program, firms are issued or may purchase permits for each ton
of pollution they emit. Once permits have been initially distributed, firms are free to buy, sell, or
trade pollution permits with other firms in the market. Each firms decision to buy or sell
permits will depend on the market price of the permit relative to then- control costs.
2.3) Command-and-Control Approaches
Conventional approaches to regulating the environment are referred to as " command-
and-control" regulations since they allow little flexibility in the means of achieving goals. Early
envu-onmental policies, such as the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the Clean Water Act of 1972,
relied almost exclusively on these approaches.
In general, command-and-control regulations force firms to shoulder identical shares of
-5-
the pollution-control burden, regardless of the relative costs to them of this burden.
Command-and-control regulations do this by setting uniform standards for firms, the most
prevalent of which are technology-based and performance-based standards. Technology-based
standards specify the method, and sometimes the actual equipment that firms must use to comply
with a particular regulation. For example, all electric utilities might be required to employ a
specific type of scrubber to remove PM10. A performance standard sets a uniform control target
for firms, while allowing some latitude in how this target is met. For example, a regulation
might limit the number of allowable units of a pollutant released in a given time period, but
might not dictate the means by which this is achieved. Holding all firms to the same target can
be expensive and, in some circumstances, counter productive. While standards can effectively
limit emissions of pollutants, they impose high societal costs hi the process, by forcing firms to
resort to expensive pollution control technologies.
2.4) Economic Critique of Command and Control Regulations
Economists have long been critical of the traditional command and control regulatory
response for protecting the natural environment. First, command and control (CAC) regulations
are inherently inefficient. Economic theory provides a strong argument that incentive based
regulation is preferable to direct regulation on the grounds of efficiency. In terms of economics,
efficiency is achieved when resources are allocated such that all gains from trade are exhausted.
Regulatory standards do not provide a mechanism through which gains from trade can be
explored. As Nichols (1984) notes, applying inflexible performance standards to heterogeneous
firms with different processes and control costs defies this efficiency condition because
variations in control costs and benefits are not considered. The result is a highly inefficient
allocation of control efforts across emission sources, too tight in some instances, and too lenient
in others.
Another major criticism of environmental regulations is that they fail to consider the cost
and benefits of the standards they are imposing. Most standards do not even acknowledge the
tradeoff which exists between protection and control costs. The level of control defined by
BACT may cost one firm $1000 per ton of PM10 abated, and another firm only $500 per ton of
abatement. Despite ones views about how much money should be spent to protect the
environment, it cannot be denied that gains could be made by reallocating control efforts to
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firms with lower control costs.
Standards do not create an incentive for firms to seek innovative control methods to
reduce emissions. A firm already in compliance with the standards set on their permit, stands to
gain nothing by reducing their emissions below the prescribed level. If firms were rewarded by
decreasing their PM10 output, then such measures would not be seen as an expenditure, but
rather as an investment. Under an incentive structure, firms would gain both community
recognition and economic rewards for their innovative abatement efforts.
Finally, CAC standards discourage R&D and innovation. Under CAC regulations, firms
are afraid that any efforts made to reduce emissions beyond that which is stipulated by BACT
will be used to set even tighter BACT requirements. This fear makes firms unwilling to invest
in control technologies. Without this investment, dynamic efficiency or gains made through the
competition in inputs to pollution control are substantially reduced.
2.5) Characteristics of Market-Based Policy Instruments
Market-based instruments have captured the attention of environmental policy makers
and businesses because of the potential advantages they offer over traditional command-and-
control approaches. The two most notable advantages are (i) cost effectiveness and (ii) dynamic
efficiency.
Market-based instruments are cost-effective because they require fewer total resources to
achieve the same level of pollution control. Instead of equalizing pollution levels among firms as
is the case under CAC regulations, market-based instruments equalize the incremental amount
that firms spend to reduce pollution or their marginal cost. As Stavin's (1996) points out,
"Command-and-control approaches could theoretically also achieve this cost-effective solution;
However, this would require that different standards be set for each pollution source, and, that
policy makers obtain detailed information about the compliance costs each firm faces. Such
information is simply not available to government"(p6). In contrast, under economic incentives,
market forces assure that control responsibility is rearranged until costs are equalized.
Dynamic efficiency is often overlooked when noting the benefits of emissions trading.
Dynamic efficiencies are secondary benefits that accrue as a result of technology innovation and
diffusion.(Burtraw 1995) Under an emissions trading scenario, firms realize that each ton of
pollution emitted has a price associated with it, and that it is in their financial best interest to
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seek new and cheaper ways to reduce these emissions. As a result of this effort to actively seek
out control technologies, competition increases in input markets to pollution control. This places
downward pressure on prices making the next round of pollution control investments even
cheaper.
m theory, if properly designed and implemented, market-based instruments allow any
desired level of pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest possible overall cost to society.
Or, alternatively, they offer more control for the same level of resources. They provide
incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution by those firms that can achieve these
reductions most cheaply.
2.6) Resistance to Market Incentives
While the arguments for emissions trading are compelling, market based incentive
programs such as emissions trading have yet to see wide spread application. After over 20 years
of theoretical speculation, market incentives play only a small role in the formation of
environmental policies, or private firms' decision on pollution control. The reasons for this are
many.
A major reason for a lack of initiative to pursue incentive based regulatory approaches is
due to the anti-regulatory climate that has developed during the last decade. This is evident in
the fact that there has not been a great deal of new environmental regulation passed by congress.
In fact, since 1990, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act have been the only major
environmental laws re-authorized. In an era where any new efforts by the government regulate
industry are met with strong opposition, even innovative regulatory approaches are resisted.
There also exists a general fear by environmental compliance and enforcement personnel
that if the regulatory framework is changed, then their skills will no longer be needed (Stavins
1996). Traditional regulatory programs call for personnel with technical or legal backgrounds,
but market based programs would require a much different skill mix including economists. It is
a rationale response to resist programs that could affect ones employment security.
Environmental groups and the uniformed public are often opposed to emissions trading
programs. In their view, issuing emission allowances to firms and then allowing them to trade
them amongst one another is like licensing pollution, or selling it to the highest bidder. What
these groups fail to take into account is that traditional regulatory approaches have been giving
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away this right for free. Environmental groups also feel like letting go of the "environmental
reigns" on firm behavior by switching to ET would be taking a giant step backward in the fight
to improve environmental quality.
Fear of Change and the tendency to adhere to the status quo is another major reason for
opposition to ET. In general, businesses are cautious of the regulatory process especially when
the process involves spending time and money to learn new operational frameworks for
pollution control. Despite how flexible or cost-effective the regulation is supposed to be, the
tendency to resist the unknown is strong. Firms often perceive that political forces beyond their
control might unfavorably distort the design of the program in an effort to simply up the ante on
environmental clean up.
3) Literature Review
Emissions trading is not a new concept. The idea dates back to Pigou's (1932)
Economics of Welfare. In this work, Pigou developed the polluter pays principle. He suggested
that when economic activity creates undesirable pollution, the government should impose a
charge equal to the damages caused by the pollution thereby forcing firms to internalize those
costs. His work has been greatly expanded and modified since its inception, but the core idea
remains the same. Externality problems are best dealt with by harnessing market forces, rather
than through the imposition of direct regulation.
Ronald Coase (1960), in what has become know as the Coase theorem, furthered the case
for economic incentives. Coase's work unlike Pigou's was not dependent on the polluter pays
principle. In the famous Coase Theorem, it is argued that as long as property rights are well
defined, and transaction costs are negligible, the market can be used to efficiently allocate non-
market goods such as clean air. According to this theory, regardless of the initial allocation of
rights to pollute, disputing parties will work out a mutually beneficial agreement that is pareto
efficient. This theory has seen broad application, and can be used to solve a variety of
externality problems. Marketable permits are an extension of this theory.
Permits rely heavily on the assignment of property rights. Firms may be required to buy
entitlements, or they may be issued them free of charge. In either case, once these entitlements
are allocated, the property rights of the permit holder must be clearly defined, secure, and
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enforceable in order for the market to work. Firms that reduce their emission below then-
allotted number of permits may sell then1 excess permits to other firms for a profit, or apply them
to other sources under their
control to offset higher
emissions elsewhere. As
Hanley (1997) notes, in
order for permits to serve
their purpose as incentives
to change pollution control
to the desired level, total
p*
P'
\cP<S* o many Figure 2. Permit Supply vsrmits issued Marginal Abatement Cost.5'
At permit level high, the price of each
permit is louier. gKren abatement
costs, a firms will chose to hols more
permits. A firm mill control emission
— ^ ^^ at ail levels below P*. and buy permits
^~^^~^ MA( *°r *" ^ """ty above p*. It is easy to
see that Issuing too many permits mill
p t p impede control efforts.
Em. Max emission levels within a
region are limited so that
the permits are valuable to producers. Limiting the amount of permits available, makes emission
a valuable commodity, providing the correct incentive for firms to trade, and seek cost effective
reductions in emission levels.
The supply of permits available is the single most important factor of a market based
trading program.(Figure 2) The supply influences the market price of each permit. The price
provides the correct incentive for firms to arrange emission levels such that the cost minimizing
solution is reached (Hanley et al 1997). At the margin each firm will evaluate the cost of each
permit relative to then- own cost per ton of abatement. A firm will then decide on their own
privately optimal level of control. If the market price is lower than abatement costs at the
margin, a profit maximizing firm will buy permits instead of implementing further emission
controls. When too many permits are on the market, the price will fall. The permits will have
lost their scarcity value. When the market is flooded with low cost permits, a firm will hold
more permits rather than invest in pollution control since this is the least cost option. Refer to
Figure 2 for a graphical representation this result. In this example, the MAC curve represents a
firms demand for permits. At S* P*, the market for permits has cleared. A firm will demand
permits for all levels of activity above this level because abatement costs are higher than the
price of each permit. It is clear from this graph, that issuing too many permits (S*) will lower
the market value of each permit. Firms will chose to hold more permits, and abatement efforts
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will end at P*S*. The opposite will occur if too few permits are issued. Firms will find it
cheaper to abate than hold permits. In extreme cases, constricting the supply of permits may
force firms to consider levels of abatement that are not technically feasible, or put some firms at
a severe competitive disadvantage. For these reasons, implementing agencies must carefully
consider technical feasibility, control costs, and ambient goals when deciding on the number of
permits to issue.
Tradable permits are attractive to regulators because of their power to control the supply
of permits. This provides permit programs with a margin of safety even if control costs are
higher than expected. This quantity rationing mechanism alone however, is not sufficient to
ensure tradable permits meet their intended purpose of lowering the cost of meeting emission
goals. Hahn and Noll (1990) identify other key criteria the permit market should satisfy in order
to function efficiently and meet air quality goals. First, the number of permits must be limited
and well defined so that they are valuable. Second, permits should be freely tradeable with
minimal transaction costs. Third, permits must be storable in order to guarantee firms a supply
of permits in times of thin trading. Fourth, penalties for violating a permit must cost more than
the price of the permit itself, in order to keep firms within the rules of the game. Finally, firms
must be allowed to keep any profits they earn as a result of permit trading. The result will be a
complete market for pollution trading, which provides firms capability to achieve cost
minimizing objectives.
3.1) Key Design Issues
3.1.1 Letting go of the CAC Core:
Many critics, afraid of relinquishing control to ET believe that it is not necessary to rely
entirely to a emission trading market to ensure that air quality objectives are met. Instead, it is
believed that incentives can be grafted to a CAC core and and still obtain cost savings benefits.
As Merrifield (1990) elaborates, "despite growing recognition of the Clean Air Act's
shortcomings, efforts to address them are focused on gradual evolutionary change, rather than a
complete overhaul" (p.368). Baumol and Blackman (1980) have argued that economic
incentives can be gradually implemented into traditional regulatory approaches. They also
suggest that this approach can yield similar results as a permit trading market. Levin (1987)
furthered the case for grafted implementation based on the power of inertia. He argued that the
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evolutionary approach is the only viable alternative. Regulators and polluters as Levin puts it
"will stick with the devil they know". Efforts to implement revolutionary policies will be
wasted.
Merrifield suggests that existing air quality policies cannot be addressed with piecemeal
modifications that combine a CAC regulatory core with "add-on opportunities" to trade
emissions based on economic incentives. Preserving firm level controls distorts incentives, and
severely constrains the performance of trading markets.
3.1.2) The Problem with Non-uniformly Mixed Pollutants
Many pollutants, including PM10, do not mix evenly in the atmosphere. Instead, they
exhibit high concentrations in localized areas near the actual source(s) of emission. In cases
where emissions depend on both the amount of pollution discharged, and the spatial distribution
of the pollution in the atmosphere the use of ET becomes a major concern for air pollution
control authorities. The question becomes, how to ensure that that neither local nor regional air
quality is compromised as a result of emission trades.
The use of Ambient Permit Markets (APM) are one way to ensure that emissions trades
do not compromise air quality standards at local monitoring points. Under a APM, the tradable
commodity is standardized around a given monitoring station. This ensures that local air quality
does not exceed a pre-determined air quality standard. Unfortunately, as Tietenburg notes, APM
are currently not administratively feasible due to transaction complexity. An ambient permit
system is complex because it involves a separate permit around each monitored receptor. Since
a source's emissions affect each monitored receptor differently in each market, a rather complex
pattern of trading transactions would develop (p343). This complexity detracts from a firm's
ability to make informed trading decisions.
Another measure used to ensure that non-uniformly mixed pollutants do not violate air
quality standards is rules governing trades. Trading rules regulate each trading transaction. All
emissions transactions are constrained pending the evaluation and approval by the air pollution
control authority. In many cases, large emissions trades are subject to expensive air dispersion
modeling to ensure that the trade will not cause a violation. In addition to adding administrative
costs to trades, trading rules also discourage firm's from investing in emissions abatement
technologies. Trading rules create a large amount of uncertainty. A firm will not invest in
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pollution control if they fear that trades will be blocked by overly strict trading rules.
Finally, The use of a "cycle and zone" trading system can be used to mitigate against
violations at local receptor points. The cycle and zone system creates trading markets with
clearly defined trading boundaries and compliance time frames. Firms may only trade across
zonal boundaries during specified time frames. Cycle and zone trading can be set up in such a
way to allow for maximum trading flexibility without compromising air quality. If cross zonal
trades do occur out of cycle, then modeling requirements may be imposed. Although, this
method does limit potential cost savings, it is by far the most preferable method in the the case
of non-uniformly mixed pollutants.
3.1.3) Monitoring and Enforcement Problems
Monitoring and enforcement are other areas of concern under an emissions trading
market. The ability to accurately quantify emissions is especially important under emissions
trading. Compliance with required reductions, and claimed reductions cannot be certified
without an accurate record of emissions. But continuous emission monitoring is expensive and
would consume resources that could otherwise be devoted to pollution control or the purchase of
permits. With strict monitoring requirements in place potential cost savings would be reduced.
This is often cited as one of the primary detriments to emission trading. Enforcement can also
detract from the cost savings advantages. It is expensive to hire enforcement personnel to make
sure firms are not cheating. Without adequate enforcement personnel to police cheating
behavior, a plant manager would have an incentive to claim false emission reductions. There are
other options that can be used to record emissions such as periodic sampling. These methods are
less accurate, and still quite costly.
3.2) Historical Experience
3.2.1) Acid Rain Program
"In 1992, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a major producer of electric power,
purchased the rights to generate more pollution due to emissions trading. Specifically, TVA
bought 10,000 tons of pollution allowances from Wisconsin Power and Light. This transaction
was made possible by Title IV of the Clean Air Act of 1990, which required power companies to
reduce then- emissions of Acid Rain causing pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, but provided
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flexibility in how firms could achieve the reductions" (Miller p. 96). This flexibility allowed
TVA to fail their reduction requirement since Wisconsin Power and Light exceeded their
reduction. In essence, Wisconsin Power and Light was paid to reduce TVA's emissions.
Provided the overall reduction goal is met, the allocation of control is left to the market.
Title IV if The Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive based
regulation through the use of tradable emission allowances. The "Acid Rain Program", as it is
called, was the first major step taken to put economic theory into practice. The program applies
to electric generating facilities that emit sulfur dioxide. The program imposed a sharp emissions
cap on generating facilities, but allowed firms the flexibility to select the most cost-effective
method to meet the reduction requirement. Compliance options under the Acid Rain Program
include the purchase allowances from other firms that have exceeded their requirements,
installing emissions controls such as scrubbers, upgrading plants, closing plants, switching to
cleaner fuels such as natural gas, or fuel blending (blend coals w/ various sulfur content to lower
average emissions). Depending on the market price of allowances relative to their own private
abatement costs, firms choose their own privately optimal compliance strategy.
3.2.2) Evaluating the Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain program has provided substantial cost savings relative to what would have
achieved under command and control, yet the program has fallen short of the theoretically
envisioned expectations. Trading volumes in the allowance market have been far lower than
expected. In contrast to this fact, Burtraw indicates that industry's cost of compliance has been
surprisingly low. This has defied the belief that low cost compliance can only be achieved under
active trading. Burtraw (1995) explains this phenomonon by pointing out that active trading is
neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for cost effectiveness. Theoretically, cost could be
minimized if control responsibility was allocated according to marginal pollution. In this case,
no trading would be needed.
It turns out that low control costs despite inactive trading can be attributed to lower than
expected control costs. Prices in input markets to pollution control have dramatically decreased
as a result of dynamic incentives. For example, the price of rail transport of low sulfur coal
decreased substantially under the Acid Rain Program, due to increased competitive pressure.
The price of scrubbers and fuel blending also decreased. The increased demand for pollution
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control greatly accelerated competitive forces and led to overall lower prices. It remains to be
seen whether the trading market can continue to demonstrate lower costs without increasing
trading activity.
3.2.3) RECLAIM
The Region Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) program was established by the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SQAQMD) to give companies flexibility in
meeting emission reduction requirements and lower the cost of compliance by as much as 50%.
Under RECLAIM, companies are allowed to choose their control methods and timing of the
required reductions. This experimental market based program was designed to be more cost
effective than the old command and control rules because it allows the opportunity to choose an
emission reduction program that best fits the needs of the facility. A facility that finds
innovative ways to exceed their reduction requirement may sell their excess allowance credits to
other firms to help off-set compliance costs.
Facilities were included in the RECLAIM program if their emissions historically
exceeded 4 tons per year. Each RECLAIM facility is issued a single facility permit, and based
on its historical emissions were given an annual emission allocation. This allocation is generally
referred to as an emission cap which shrinks annually. Each year the emission allocation shrinks
by 7%. RECLAIM facilities are forced to achieve their yearly emission reduction through the
use of add-on controls, modernization, process improvements, or purchasing RECLAIM Trading
Credits (RTC's). An emission reduction credit authorizes the holder to emit one pound of NOX
for a specified year, and at the end of each year any remaining credits expire. RTC's under
RECLAIM may not be banked for use in future years.
3.2.4) Trading Emissions Under RECLAIM
Trading is a term used to identify a sale or purchase of an RTC. The term trading is used
in the emissions trading market much the way it is used on the New York Stock Exchange.
Once a facility evaluation has been conducted, and the point where its estimated emissions
exceed its allocation has been identified, a company may decide whether or not to trade RTC's.
RECLAIM companies whose annual allocation is insufficient for current production levels may
either decide to purchase RTC's or install control technology. Facilities that do not use all of
their allocation in a given year may sell them to other companies.
-15-
The trading rules are set up under RECLAIM to allow for maximum flexibility without
compromising air quality objectives. The trading is structure on a Zone and Cycle basis to avoid
impacts in localized areas. Strict monitoring and reporting requirements ensure that facilities are
meeting the reduction requirements. Trading rules do not require that the RTC's be banked prior
to use as with command and control rules, and authorization is not required to execute a trade.
This ensures that the administrative costs of the program remain minimal. RTC's are traded on
a 1:1 ratio, and are not subject to devaluation. RTC's are traded for specific years, and therefore
can be used to achieve both short and long term compliance.
3.2.5) RECLAIM Evaluation
Emissions trades under RECLAIM have been active relative to the Acid Rain Program.
More than $10 million in trades have been registered since the program started in 1994.
However, complicated trading rules, strict monitoring requirements, and a market flooded with
low cost RTC's has stalled overall performance. It is estimated that as the supply continues to
ratchet down market prices will increase correcting the faulty price signals that are prevailing in
early years. At the present time, an ample supply of low cost permits is the compliance option
of choice. Firm's will continue to use this option until the price of RTC's causes firm's to think
seriously about other control options. The price of RTC's is expected increase substantially in
the year 2000 as other trading credits that were grandfathered into the RECLAIM program are
used up, and as emission reduction requirements continue to ratchet down. RTC prices averaged
$26/ton for 1994 and $1500/ton for credits in 2010.
Overall, implementation of RECLAIM has been highly successful. Analysis after two
years of operation indicates that the program is meeting its emission reduction goal, and has
substantially reduced compliance cost (SCAQMD 1997 RECLAIM Annual Report). Aggregate
actual emissions from facilities under RECLAIM were below allocations for the first two
compliance years. Despite some early successes, two fundamental deficiencies have surfaced.
First, the market is made up of uniformed buyers and sellers. This has led to erratic prices set by
buyers who do not understand the market, or firms selling permits for based on their own cost
evaluation rather basing prices on market trends. The immature market combined with a lack of
confidence many managers have with the trading program have caused many to delay
purchasing credits or installing emission controls. Another program flaw is that permits for
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compliance in a specified year must be used in that year. Companies who hold excess credits
must pay a penalty for each excessive credit. This causes facilities to dump cheap permits on the
market without respect to market prices. It also discourages managers from investing in cost
effective emission controls. Managers are not willing to take risks on uncertain market
conditions when they alone must take responsibility for a bad business decision.
3.3) Lessons Learned
In order to achieve optimal results, trading rules should be designed to deliver the
following benefits: l)reduce transaction costs; 2) increase certainty as to the rights bestowed
under the program; 3) ensure competitive market conditions; 4) offer incentives to participate;
and 5) provide sufficient information to program participants.
3.4) Market Simulation Under Emissions Trading and CAC
The following hypothetical example will compare compliance costs under a CAC
regulatory structure and under a emissions trading structure. Although the example will assume
that firms have the information needed to make calculated decisions, (a condition that does not
always hold true hi the real world) the example will be sufficient to make general comparisons
about firm behavior and compliance costs. Firms will be divided into three different classes
based on their marginal abatement cost (MAC) in order to simplify the example. A graph will
be used to show firm behavior and outcomes under a trading market scenario. In order to see if
the market leads to a more efficient outcome, the compliance costs of a 20% reduction in PM10
emissions will be compared to the cost of achieving the same standard through the direct
regulation of each firm.
Given the three types of construction firms, type A firms emit a larger percentage of
PM10 than type B or C firms. Each firm class faces different abatement cost owing to company
size, project size, labor costs, construction practices, time table, and weather conditions present
during construction activity. The abatement costs given will assume a maximum 60% removal
efficiency. This accounts for technical imperfections. No matter how much money a firm
spends on abatement, it is not possible to reduce emissions to zero. The inequality in abatement
costs provides the motivation for market permits. Firms with the lowest marginal abatement
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cost (MAC) have an incentive to reduce emissions the most provided they can sell their unused
allowances to other firms for a profit.
Table 1 Market Simulation Data
Number of firms
current emissions in tons
Allowable emissions
Reductions required to meet
goal
Abatement costs/ton
Type A
60
13800
11040
20%
500
TypeB
50
11385
9108
20%
350
TypeC
40
9315
7452
20%
250
3.4.1) Direct Regulation Costs
The data above indicates that Type A firms must cut PM10 emissions by 2,760 tons in
order to meet the 20% reduction goal. Type A firms will pay a total of (2760*$500)$1.38
million dollars if each firm individually meets the standard reduction. Type B firms must reduce
emissions by 2,277 tons. At a cost of $350/ton this will cost Type B firms a total of $796,950.
Finally, Type C firms must cut emissions by 1,863 tons at $250/ton, Type C firms will pay
$465,750. Totaling the individual control costs of each firm results in a total cost of $2,642,700.
This figure only reflects control expenditures. In order to determine total compliance costs,
record keeping, emission reporting, and other administrative compliance expenditures must be
added to this.
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Figure 3. Market Simply and Demand for PM10 Permits
F'rice.fton MAC=demand . Market clean at
400J Q
supplied = Q
Demanded
2760
Supply is created by firms
utio enc«ed ihe 20%
requirement. Total supply
equals 9600 credits if
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J500.
Tots! reduction requirement
is 6.900 tons. Type C mill
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meet the remaining 2428
tons.
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since no reductions mill be
supplies unless price exceeds
abatement costs.
If firms are allowed to trade pollution permits, the total cost of meeting the 20%
reduction should decrease.
Refer to Figure 3 for a
graphic model of the trading
scenario. The supply curve
is upward sloping,
indicating that as the price
of each permit increases, the
quantity supplied increases.
The supply PM10 credits is
created by firms that reduce
then- emissions by more
Quantify Pin 10 Ailouanws A||0(mce <fcmand =2760 at a clearing price of 5400
than the 20% requirement. in 1000 ton* K ,.,,u suppfy 2609 credits, and B di supply isi.
The total market supply
equals 16,500 allowances. This figure is the total of each firms allowable emissions after the
20% reduction factoring in a PM10 removal efficiency of 60%. The supply curve begins at a
price of $250. No firm will supply reduction allowances if the price is below this amount.
When the market price exceeds $250, Type C firms will begin to supply reduction credits. Type
C firms will find it profitable to reduce their PM10 emissions by the maximum amount possible,
and sell their reduction credits to other firms since their abatement cost/ton is less than $250.
Type B firms will begin to supply reduction credits when the market price exceeds their MAC of
$350. Like Type C firms, they will find it profitable to exercise the maximum amount of
abatement and sell their reduction credits. Type A firms will not supply credits until the market
price exceeds $500 per ton. Type A firms supply will never enter the market though since the
6,900 ton reduction requirement will have already been supplied by C and B firms by the time
prices reach $500.
At a market clearing price of $400 per ton, Type C firms will have supplied 2,609
allowances, and type B firms 3187 allowances, however, only 151 of B's allowances will be
demanded. Type A firms will find it advantageous to buy allowances from these firms (2609
from A and 151 from B) rather than abate emissions at this price level.
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The economic model above shows three separate demand curves owing to the different
abatement costs of each firm class. The demand curves are upward sloping indicating that as the
permit price falls, the quantity demanded will increase. The above market simulation model
shows when each firm will enter the market for PM10 allowances. Type C firms will demand
reduction credits equal to 1863 tons as long as the price is below $250. Type B firms will
demand 2277 allowance credits when the price is below $350, and Type A will demand 2760
permits until the price exceeds $500/ton.
3.4.2) Measuring Results
The air quality goal called for a 20% reduction in PM10 from all construction sources
within the valley. Last year PM10 emissions from construction sources totaled approximately
34,500 tons. Based on the 1995 PM10 inventory, a 20% reduction would cap PM10 emissions
at 27,600 tons. This means that collectively or individually, emission would have to fall by
6,900 tons. Under the standard regulatory approach this would require that each firm reduce
emissions by 46 tons. Under, the market trading model, the collective amount of control did not
change, only the distribution of control. In the above example, 40 Type C firms contributed
4,472 tons of reduction requirement, and the remaining 2,428 tons were supplied by Type B
firms.
3.4.3) Compliance Cost
Under the market trading scenario, type A firms bought 2,760 tons of allowance credits
for $400 per credit totaling $1,104,000. Type B firms will reduce emissions by 2,428 tons
which is more than their required reduction. This reduction will cost ($350*2,428) $849,800.
This amount will be partially offset by the sale of 151 reduction credits for $400/credit for a
$60,400. This will reduce Type B firms compliance costs to $789,400. Type C firms will
reduce emissions by the maximum amount possible to 4,472 tons. Type C firms will pay
($250*4,472) $1,118,000 for this level of reduction. This amount will be offset by $1,043,600
from the sale of 2609 (4472-1863) reduction credits at $400 per credit. This will reduce Type C
firms compliance costs to $74,400. The total compliance cost for all firm classes in the trading
market is $1,967,800. Comparing this total to the $2,642,700 paid by firms under direct
regulation reveals a savings $674,900. The market trading approach reduced the cost of meeting
the desired air quality goal by over $700, 000.
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3.4.4) Analyzing Results:
The market simulation, although hypothetical, showed that emissions trading is an
attractive policy instrument. The example could easily apply to any group of sources with
heterogeneous control costs. Emission trading substantially reduced compliance costs of
meeting the desired air quality goal. Clearly this method represents a more efficient allocation
of resources. Control efforts were redistributed to firms with the lowest control costs. Firms
with low control cost gladly accepted this control burden, since in effect high cost firms pay
them an attractive price to handle their share of the control burden.
4) Building On Experience: Considering Emissions Trading In Las Vegas
4.1) Implementing a Trading Program
Building on what has been discussed so far, the focus of this paper will move to
considering the feasibility of implementing a "full blown" PMIO Trading Market in Las Vegas.
"Full blown" means that it will not represent a supplement to the CAC regulatory structure
already in place. Feasibility will be determined based upon analysis of control costs, obstacles to
implementation, political acceptability, and impacts to air quality. The PM10 market will
include all stationary sources within the Las Vegas Valley that emit over 1 ton of PMIO, and all
construction sources that emit over 5 tons of PM10. The program will require all facilities
included in the trading universe to reduce their emissions by 20% based on the Clark County
Health District 1995 PM10 Emission Inventory. Facilities included in the trading program will
be free of all tradition regulatory requirements except B ACT requirements, and New Source
Review requirements. Regulatory requirements that will be dropped include:
• ATC requirements will be dropped
• New Source Performance Standards requirements will be dropped
• Permit costs and emission fees for permit review will be dropped
• Source modification requirements will be dropped
• Annual emission fees and emission unit fees will be dropped
• Offset requirements will be dropped for all PM10 emissions
The objective of the trading program is twofold. The first objective is to increase value;
(the ability to buy more air quality for each dollar spent). This is accomplished by giving firms
-21-
flexibility to decide their own privately optimal compliance strategy. The second objective is to
provide the correct incentive for firms to make proactive rather than reactive emission control
decisions . The 20% emission cap will provide this incentive.
4.2) Key Design Issues
4.2.1) Establishing the Trading Universe
This section will identify sources to be included in the PMIO trading market and subject
to the 20% emission cap. As mentioned above, all stationary sources with historical PMIO
emissions over 1 ton per year, and all construction activities that disturb over 1 acres would be
included in the trading universe.
According to the Clark County Health District Air Pollution Control, there are
approximately 850 stationary sources permitted in the Las Vegas Valley, of these about 119
facilities would be included in the PM 10 trading universe. The 119 facilities include all
permitted stationary sources with historical emissions in excess of 1 ton per year (TPY).
Together these sources account for about 1,800 tons of PM10 per year. If all sources met their
•reduction goal of 20% valley wide PMIO emissions from stationary sources would be reduced
to 1,440 TPY.
As Table 2 indicates, construction sources, which include all temporary processes
involving land clearing, grading, trenching, material unloading, and building, are categorically
the largest contributor to PMIO emissions annually. This is due to the rapid rate of growth Las
Table 2
Source Category
Stationary Sources
Residential Wood Burning
On Road Exhaust
1995 Emissions 20% reduction % Contribution
(tons)
1,855
309
823
1,484
247
658
2.1
.4
.9
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Paved Roads
Unpaved Roads
Construction Activities
Disturbed Land
Off-Road Racing
Background
Totals
6,759
6,142
34,849
4,944
166
31,414
87,261
5,407
4,913
27,849
3,955
133
31,414
76,092
7.7
7.1
39.9
5.7
.2
36
100
Vegas continues to experience. These activities account for 40% of PM10 emissions annually.
Capping emissions at 80% of the based on 1995 emission level would reduce PM10 by almost
7,000 tons per year.
Unlike stationary sources, construction sources are not required under the Clean Air Act
to obtain an operating permit. This is because construction activities due to their non-permanent
nature defy the definition of a stationary source. As a result, it is difficult to determine the exact
number of facilities to include in the market. Also, due to the nature of construction sources, it
is not practical to allocate emissions based on historical production in any given year.
Construction sources would not be "pre-qualified" for the program like stationary sources.
Instead, construction activities would be required to opt into the trading program for all site
activities involving the disturbance of 1 acre or more.
4.2.2) Allocating Emissions
In the case of Stationary Sources, each of the facilities included in the trading universe
will be issued permits free of charge at the beginning of each operating year. Each permit will
equal 1 ton of PM10. Allocations will be based on the average PM10 emissions for the last
three operating years. At the beginning of each year, each facility will be issued allowances.
Any facility that exceeds their allocation, must purchase permits from another firm who has
exceeded their reduction requirement. Stiff penalties will be imposed on firms who do not have
enough permits to cover their emissions at the end of the operating year.
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Figure 4. Facility Allocation vs.
Annual Emissions Growth
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The 20% reduction in
emissions will be gradually
imposed rather than
instantaneous. This will allow
facilities time to get used to the
trading market, and plan their
compliance strategy (Figure 4)
Allocations will shrink by 5% a year until the 20% reduction goal is met. As allocations begin
to fall below expected emissions, permits will become especially valuable. Firms that find ways
to make cost effective reductions could make substantial profits as permit prices increase.
In the case of construction sources, allocating permits will not be quite so simple. Since
emission levels with construction sources are highly unpredictable from year to year, there is no
fair way to allocate credits to each facility. Instead, permits worth 1 ton of PM10, would be
issued to all facilities required to obtain permits on a quarterly basis. Permits would be issued
based on a control efficiency of 85%, and allocated to facilities on a quarterly basis. Additional
permits, if available, could be purchased at the prevailing market price. If a facility
demonstrated that they had not used all of their allocation, they could sell their excess credits to
other firms or keep them for future projects. PM10 credits would be rationed over a period of 4
quarters. This would amount to 7,000 tons per quarter, totaling 28,000 ton per year. All un-
used credits would be transferred to the next quarter; however, at the end of each year unused
allocations would dumped. Discounting would be applied to credits held by firms used in years
other than the year of issuance. This way, firms would not be completely discouraged from
investing in emission controls under conditions of market uncertainty.
4.2.3) Creating Tradable PM10 Credits
Flexibility is achieved by giving firms multiple compliance options instead of just one.
There are a variety of options available to create tradable PM10 credits. However, in order to
sell permits a firm must certify that their emissions are below their allocation. A firm may
install hardware that improves control efficiency thus generating excess credits (refer to Table 2)
for a list of available PM10 control methods and hardware. Other credit generating activities
include plant shutdowns, road paving, and stabilization of disturbed land.
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Baghouse Filters
Water Trucks
Water Spray Systems
Water Foggers
Foam Spray Application
Wind Dams
Chemical Dust
suppresants/stabilizers
Staged Project Planning
Install Pavement at Unpaved
Sites
;->: ,:: Appl?pti§a s: .<- : 1;
:;S: : W ::::;; -^<
Stationary sources that can be
enclosed
Stationary /Construction
Stationary Sources
Stationary Sources
Stationary/Construction
Stationary/Construction
Construction/Stationary/Distub
ed Land/Unpaved roads
Construction
Construction/Stationary
(used to mitigate land dist)
S:V . :.\V : '^
99%*
87% @2% moisture**
90%*
95%*
85%*
25%***
90%*
50%***
50***
* Efficiency obtained from manufacturers
** EPA document AP-42
*** Best engineering guess
4.2.4) Compliance Options
Facilities subject to the trading market have a variety of compliance options available to
them. Facilities may meet emission targets by purchasing additional credits, implement cost-
effective emission control methods, retire plants, or limit operating hours. In order to determine
the best compliance option, a cost analysis of each alternative is required.
Although some facilities may choose to reduce their emission by closing down plants or
postponing projects, for many companies installing control technology or improving existing
processes may be the best compliance option. The installation of hardware may cost less than
purchasing credits on the open market, it may also enable the facility to generate excess credits,
thereby further offsetting compliance costs.
4.2.5) Monitoring & Enforcement
Monitoring and enforcement are key areas of concern. The ability to accurately record
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emissions is critical in determining compliance with emission targets. Also, enforcement must
be regular and swift so firms will not cheat or attempt non-compliance. Cheating firms, and
non-compliance both have the ability to undermine program goals. As such, emissions
monitoring and reporting would be a strict requirement of the program.
Monitoring and reporting is a major strike against the case for a PM10 trading market.
The cost of continues emissions monitors (CEM), and other suitable equipment is extremely
prohibitive. Efforts to impose this requirement would be strongly resisted by industry. Further,
installing CEM equipment at non-permanent locations such construction sites is simply not
feasible. A possible alternative to CEM installations is periodic emissions sampling done with
portable mass flow monitors. Period emissions "spot checks" could be used to estimate average
emission rates. The spot checked emissions would be converted to into pounds per hour and
then multiplied by operating hours to determine total PM10 emissions. Although periodic
sampling alleviates the need for CEM's in many cases, even this method would be quite
expensive. The County would have to staff additional positions and purchase expensive portable
monitoring equipment in order to conduct spot checks on all non-CEM facilities.
4.3) Evaluating Feasibility
4.3.1) Impacts To Air Quality
One of the most notable benefits of the trading market is the 20% emission cap.
Reducing PM10 emission by 20% based on 1995 production levels would save about 7,400 ton
of PM10 annually. This saving would have a positive affect on air quality in the Las Vegas
Valley. Despite this benefit, there is a legitimate concern that PM10 trades could result in
violations of air quality standards at PM10 monitoring stations
Policy makers have good reason to fear incentive based regulations. Under an
emission trading structure, individual or firm decision makers do not look beyond the direct
benefits and costs when choosing one compliance option over the other. Air quality decisions
made on a decentralized basis where cost is the primary consideration, not air quality results, is a
dangerous prospect especially in the case of non-uniformly mixed pollutants. As discussed
previously, PM10 does not mix evenly in the air. Its concentration is highly dependent on
spatial and intensity factors. Trading rules and modeling requirements would need to be
imposed to ensure compliance with PM10 Air Quality Standards.
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The need for complex trading rules and emissions modeling is another major strike
against using a market based approach. Trading rules detract from the overall cost saving that
can be achieved from a trading emission because it excludes many trading opportunities. A
cycle and Zone trading structure is the best alternative available, but even this type of
arrangement would severely limit the effectiveness of the trading market. It would require that
"micro-markets" be set up in zones corresponding to area monitoring stations. Cross zonal
trades, if allowed would be subject to modeling to ensure that pollution transferred from one
zone to the other did not cause violations.
Although zonal trading boundaries reduce cost savings, they do offer some benefits. In
the case of Las Vegas such a system, would be an improvement to the current system of
offsetting. Offsetting requires that firms pay a fee of $300 dollars per ton of PM10 emission
equaling twice their actual emission output. This fee is used for road paving and other projects
that reduce valley-wide emission levels. The problem is that the emissions that are offset do not
necessarily improve air quality because the PMIO emissions that are offset by road paving are
not always next to the affected monitoring station. This means that ambient PM10
concentrations could actually increase around certain stations even though firms are offsetting
emissions at a ration of 2:1. Zonal trading boundaries improve the current offsetting system by
ensuring that improvements are made around each affected monitoring station.
4.3.2) Cost Effectiveness
Cost effectiveness is above all, the most important criteria of any incentive based
structure. Theoretical conditions have shown that the potential cost savings of incentives
relative to CAC depends on heterogeneous control cost. Greater disparity in control cost among
firms means greater cost savings. Therefore, it stands to reason that without this variation in
pollution control cost, little can be gained by reallocating emissions.
Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) determines the cost-effectiveness of one compliance
strategy over another. MAC refers to the incremental cost incurred by a firm to remove each
addition unit of PMIO in this case from the air. Up until this point, the subject of MAC has been
skimmed over in making observations about the advantage of rearranging emissions based on
control cost. However, in order to assess the feasibility of using a market for PMIO, actual cost
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data for various PM10 control strategies needs to be assessed. Cost effective evaluations are
used to identify the incremental cost of removing each ton of PM10. Each firm must evaluate
their own private abatement costs relative to the price of permits if they cannot meet their
emission allocation in order to find the least cost solution.
Cost data obtained from equipment manufacturers, and operators indicates that enough
variation in operating cost exists to provide incentives to trade control responsibility. However,
in many cases, especially in water applications, the variation is small. The cost of decreasing
PM10 emission falls as emission output increases. Firm's with high emissions stand to gain the
most by installation of control equipment. Factors that influence control costs include water
costs, labor costs, fuel costs, and operation and maintenance expenses. Water cost is the largest
single input cost for wet suppression. Most operators that use rely on water for dust suppression
must obtain an industrial use permit. The cost of water under such a permit according to the Las
Vegas Valley Water District is $1.92/1000 gallons. The difference in control cost does not come
from the varying cost of water, but the varying efficiencies with which different wet suppression
systems consume water. Systems that do not use water efficiently, and that require a lot of labor
time for maintenance are less cost effective at any given emission levels. The data included in
Table 4 should provide a general estimation of control cost. Facilities have different needs, and
their processes differ significantly. As a result precise cost estimates can only be provided on a
case by case basis.
Table 4
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*Cost data obtained from equipment vendors and plant operators. A labor rate of $ 12/hr was used, and $ 1.92/1000gallons for water
4.3.3) Firm Level Trading Decisions
Figure 5 below shows marginal abatement costs (the incremental cost of each additional
unit of PM10 removed) for a variety of PM10 emission control techniques. Note that as
emissions levels increase emission control becomes more cost-effective. Firms with low
uncontrolled emissions will find it more expensive (per ton of PM10 removed) than firms with
higher uncontrolled emissions. If armed with information on marginal control costs, firms can
make calculated buy and sell decisions at any given level of emission output. For example, if
XYZ Company used foam spray applicators to control emissions, at an emission output level of
55 tons per year the MAC or put another way, their cost of producing emission reductions would
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be approximately $2507 ton of PM10 removed. At any market price below $2507 ton XYZ
Figure 5. Cost Effective EvaU
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Company will rind it profitable to buy allowances. Similarly, if the prevailing market price is
above $250/ton, XYZ will enter selling market. Once their reduction requirement is met, XYZ
can sell all excess reductions to other firms for a profit.
Assuming that all firms in the PM10 market exhibit the same profit maximizing behavior
as XYZ company, the trading market will result in a cost minimizing solution; control efforts
will be allocated according to marginal control cost.
4.3.4) Resistance and Political Factors
No matter what the benefits of a new policy initiative there is a strong tendency to adhere
to the status quo. Regulator's and industry groups alike have legitimate reasons to fear new
policies. There are a great many political factors that underlie the policy process. The most
important of these is industry resistance to a proposed policy. In the case of a PM 10 trading
market in Las Vegas reviews from industry would differ significantly between stationary sources
and construction sources. Stationary sources are already heavily regulated under various
requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Any relief from the narrow regulatory prescription
currently enforced would be welcomed.
Resistance from construction sources on the other hand would be strong. Construction
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sources are not subject to the same rigorous requirements under the CAA as stationary sources.
They escape the permitting requirements, offsetting requirements, and other fees that stationary
sources must pay despite their large contribution to PM10 air pollution. Any attempt to impose
new regulations on construction sources would result in litigation. It could take an act Congress
to modify the Clean Air Act so that implementing agencies had the statutory authority to
regulate construction sources. The construction industry has a powerful influence on local
politics. Policy makers would be very reluctant to endorse a program that was opposed by such
a powerful industry group even if legal barriers could be overcome.
4.4) Feasibility Determination
In consideration of using a emission trading market to regulate PM10 emissions in the
Las Vegas Valley, it is the finding of this paper that the program is not feasible at the present
time. Although control cost data indicate that there is enough variety in abatement costs to
provide opportunities to gain from trading, complex trading rules, and expensive emission
monitoring requirements would severely limit the effectiveness and popularity of an emissions
trading program. In addition, legal and political barriers would make implementing such a
program nearly impossible. Until these factors can be overcome, the present system, though
more costly, may be the only viable alternative.
5.0) Conclusion
Economics is becoming increasingly important in today's regulatory environment.
Businesses and policy makers are becoming more aware of the trade-off that exists between
environmental protection and economic development. As a result cost-effective environmental
policies that take into account the cost and benefits of the standards they impose will continue to
gain popularity. This paper found that economic incentives can play a powerful role in
correcting or at least improving externality problems such as air pollution by placing a price on
each increment of pollution. The price provides the correct incentive for firms to control their
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emissions. Under CAC regulations pollution is not given a price, as a result plant managers do
not make the association that their pollution is worth money.
Incentives provide the flexibility firms need to decide their own privately optimal level of
control. This enables the cost minimizing solution to be reached. They also provide a
mechanism through which value is placed on a non-market good namely pollution. This market
value prompts firm's consider whether it is cheaper to buy pollution or prevent it. In practice
and theory emission trading showed substantial overall cost savings advantages over the direct
regulatory approach. This saving is achieved by reallocating control efforts to firms with the
lowest control costs.
As for the PM10 market in Las Vegas, the paper found that although in theory it was a
good idea, this particular pollutant is not especially conducive to decentralized regulatory
structures. Trading market complexities, difficult and expensive emission monitoring, and
political and legal barriers would all combine to make the prospect nearly impossible. Emission
trading could be applied to stationary sources alone with much greater effectiveness, however,
the gains from this would be too small to make it worth pursuing. Stationary sources are only
responsible for about 2% of PM10 emissions annually.
Although the analysis conducted in this paper didn't find that implementing emission
trading was feasible for this particular air pollution problem, opportunities remain to explore
other areas where incentives can be applied. Despite the fact that this paper uncovered many
deficiencies, I believe it also showed that incentives play a strong role in environmental policies.
It is no longer a question of if incentives work, instead the question is where to apply them in
order to achieve the best results. The bottom line is make pollution control cheap and easy, and
more might buy it.
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